The composition of the European Parliament during the 2019-2024 term in light of legal provisions and the rules of fair distribution

When legal or social norms allow for more than one way of distributing benefits or obligations, there emerges a problem in practical applications of how to choose one solution from a large number. Depending on the adopted solution, some agents participating in the distribution can enjoy a privilege at the cost of others. This problem has become considerable in practice since the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the principle of degressively proportional allocation of seats in the European Parliament. This regulation allows many feasible solutions, while no precise and transparent method of allocation has been developed depending on the numbers of populations in member states. The currently proposed apportionment of seats in the 2019-2024 term emerged as a result of consultations and the ensuing decision of the European Council. Therefore, a question emerges whether this allocation is fair, and if not, how much particular states are privileged. The chapter aims to answer these questions. It turns out that in many practical cases the computational complexity of the problem allows to develop algorithms indicating all feasible solutions. Hence, the intervals of potential shares can be determined for all contenders. A numerical analysis of the set of all legally feasible solutions and defining on the basis of the theory of preferences the term of agent’s privilege will make it possible to assess the proposed composition of the European Parliament for the next term. In view of the criteria presented in the Chap. 1 may argue that proposed allocation favors the countries with medium populations.