Chinese export gains, EU export losses, and Russian import reorientation after the 2022 sanctions

This paper examines how Russian imports were reoriented after the 2022 sanctions. Using annual bilateral trade data at the product level, it asks whether direct Chinese export gains to Russia were concentrated in the same product lines in which EU exports to Russia declined. It also studies rerouting through Hong Kong, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye. The results point to substantial post-2022 import reorientation in Russia. Direct Chinese export gains are larger in product lines where Russia had depended more heavily on EU suppliers before the sanctions. Including transit-linked flows strengthens this relationship and points to broader rerouting through intermediary economies in those same product lines. In sanction-relevant goods, direct Chinese gains offset only part of the EU shortfall, while intermediary-country channels account for a substantial additional share. On the EU side, product-level evidence also suggests that some of the lost Russian market was absorbed through higher exports of the same products to other non-transit destinations. The evidence is therefore consistent with partial direct substitution by China, broader rerouting through intermediary economies, and partial outward redirection by EU exporters, not full replacement of lost EU exports.