3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Renault, Jérôme
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	repeated games \| incomplete information \| lack of information on one side \| 3 players \| uniform equilibrium \| existence of equilibria

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/postscript
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 2. pp. 221-245.Length: 24 pages
Classification:	D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708134