A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Year of publication:	2000-08-31
Authors:	Dagan, Nir ; Volij, Oscar ; Winter, Eyal
Institutions:	Nir Dagan
Subject:	bargaining problem \| Nash solution \| axiomatic characterization \| Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives \| Twisting \| Disagreement Point Convexity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic theory and game theory.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Social Choice and Welfare 19:811-823 (2002) 12 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146795