A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Year of publication:	2001-01-09
Authors:	Dagan, Nir ; Volij, Oscar ; Winter, Eyal
Institutions:	Oscar Volij
Subject:	bargaining \| Nash bargaining solution

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic theory and game theory.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002).
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005741334