A Characterization of the Uniform Rule With Several Commodities and Agents

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbussiness

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Morimoto, Shuhei ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Ching, Stephen
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Güter \| Goods

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 769
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 3, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1547465 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198328