A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining

In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Jin, Yi ; Zhang, Jianbo
Published in:	Frontiers of Economics in China. - Higher Education Press, ISSN 1673-3568. - Vol. 8.2013, 2, p. 272-287
Publisher:	Higher Education Press
Subject:	multilateral bargaining \| heterogeneous discount factors \| stationary SPE

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888557