A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of theCore

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic formgames. Any coalition of players may deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actionsdifferent from a status quo. The outsiders of the coalition may take a coordinatedmeasure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to preempt the coalition’s commitment. If acoalition succeeds in committing to its action profile, the outsiders’ reactions constitutea core solution among themselves. A core solution is robust against the deviations ofcoalitions which expect such preemptive and reactive responses from the other players.In an externality problem where pollution is the dominant action, the core is nonempty.In any two-player strategic form game, the core is also nonempty.[...]

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Year of publication:	2010-05-14
Authors:	Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
Institutions:	Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, Iowa> / Department of Economics
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| game theory \| Koalition \| Gleichgewicht \| Externer Effekt \| Coase-Theorem \| Coase Theorem

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Extent:	357376 bytes 36 p. application/pdf
Series:	IOWA State University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Working Paper No. 09003
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; Strategic management ; Specific management methods ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)