A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Publi Good Games - An Experimental Study

In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting. We present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for collective rule when consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

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Year of publication:	2003-05-01
Authors:	Decker, Torsten ; Stiehler, Andreas ; Strobel, Martin
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Öffentliches Gut \| Public Property \| Experimentelle Spieltheorie \| Experimental Economics \| Gruppenverhalten \| group membership

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Extent:	305152 bytes 30 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction Discussion Paper ; 0311 (2003) Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(6) 2003, 751-772
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	Forecast, decision making ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Simulation methods ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; Individual Articles ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866966