A Competing Risks Model of War Termination and Leader Change

Recent research demonstrates that leader change during war significantly increases the probability of war termination. However, leader changes caused by assassinations or by elec- tions are likely to have very different effects on the possibility of bringing war to an end. This paper explores the effect of regular and irregular leader transitions on the likelihood of war ter- mination. To get around the simultaneity problem between war termination and leader change, the paper estimates a competing risks bivariate survival model. The evidence shows that leader change –regardless of its type– in large coalition systems never increases the probability of war termination, while leader change –regardless of its type– in small coalition systems never reduces the probability of war termination. In short, leader transitions in autocratic systems are more likely to bring interstate war to an end than leader transitions in democratic ones. The study also shows that, as war progresses, the effect of leader change fades away