A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

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Year of publication:	2010-03
Authors:	Ensthaler, Ludwig ; Giebe, Thomas
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Auctions \| Mechanism Design \| Knapsack Problem \| Dominant Strategy \| Budget \| Procurement

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543763