A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ensthaler, Ludwig ; Giebe, Thomas
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Beschaffung \| Budgetrestriktion \| Theorie \| Auctions \| Mechanism Design \| Knapsack Problem \| Dominant Strategy \| Budget \| Procurement

More details

Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 310
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13244 [DOI] 623209535 [GVK] hdl:10419/94180 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:310 [RePEc]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

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