A dynamic auction for multiobject procurement under a hard budget constraint
Ludwig Ensthaler; Thomas Giebe
| Year of publication: |
2010
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ensthaler, Ludwig ; Giebe, Thomas |
| Publisher: |
Mannheim [u. a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 |
| Subject: | Auctions | Mechanism Design | Knapsack Problem | Dominant Strategy | Budget | Procurement | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Beschaffung | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Theorie | Theory |
| Description of contents: |
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.
|
freely available
| Extent: | Online-Ressource (5 S.) |
|---|---|
| Series: | Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 310 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader |
| Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/94180 [Handle] |
| Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950454