A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets.

In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follows Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Noldeke, G. ; Samuelson, L.
Institutions:	Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
Subject:	GAMES \| INFORMATION \| GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	Working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200464