A Feasibility Study on Global Cooperative Nuclear Wastewater Treatment from a Cooperative Game Perspective

Abstract: The Japanese government intends to discharge radioactive nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean, which will cause catastrophic and irreversible pollution of the ocean ecology. The international community has expressed strong opposition in response to this irresponsible approach. However, the Japanese government’s decision to discharge has not changed. This study uses cooperative game theory to construct a cooperative game model based on clarifying the economic elements of nuclear wastewater treatment, applying the Cobb–Douglas function as the treatment benefit function to construct a cooperative game model, using the mathematical model to derive and demonstrate the existence of cooperative game solutions, and finally proving the economic feasibility of international cooperative treatment. Data from China, Korea, and Russia are substituted into the Shapley value model of the cooperative game model. First, the results of the study reveal that all countries exhibit the same economic feasibility, and stable negotiation solutions are available for nuclear wastewater treatment in all countries globally. Second, each new member country generates spillover benefits for other countries. Third, the marginal contribution of new member countries gradually increases with the expansion of the alliance size, resulting in economies of scale for the synergistic treatment of international alliances by new member countries. Finally, relevant countermeasures and recommendations are proposed to promote the active response of countries globally to nuclear wastewater treatment, as opposed to free-riding behavior. Studying the economic feasibility of international cooperation can have a profound impact on the formulation of world marine environmental policies in the current situation