A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2007-06
Authors:	Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio ; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel
Institutions:	Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Subject:	non-cooperative game theory \| equilibrium concepts \| perfect bayesian \| Bayes rule

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 1446
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588412