A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power

In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, Vittoria ; Montinari, Natalia ; Nardi, Chiara
Publisher:	Lund : Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Subject:	Ultimatum \| Yes/No game

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2014:16
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	786975873 [GVK] hdl:10419/260113 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_016 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208684