A MODIFIED FOLK THEOREM FOR TIME-DEPENDENT SUPERGAMES
| Year of publication: |
1988
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | FRIEDMAN, J.W. |
| Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
| Subject: | economic theory | games |
-
LARGE GAMES ARE MARKET GAMES 1. LARGE FINITE GAMES
WOODERS, M.H., (1988)
-
ON NON-ATOMIC WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAMES
EINY, E., (1988)
-
SENSITIVITY OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS TO RISK AVERSIONS
SAFRA, Z., (1988)
- More ...
-
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach.
Chen, H.C., (1996)
-
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice.
Friedman, J.W., (1991)
-
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach
CHEN, Hsiao-Ch., (1996)
- More ...