A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction

In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous decision nodes.

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Year of publication:	1995-10
Authors:	Balkenborg, Dieter ; Winter, Eyal
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	backward induction \| common knowledge \| epistemic logic

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie B.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968249