A Nobel Prize for property rights theory
Year of publication: |
March 2017
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Authors: | Holden, Richard T. |
Published in: |
Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 8.2017, 1, p. 1-3
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Subject: | contracts | firms | incomplete contracts | property-rights theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Vertrag | Contract | Sachenrecht | Law of property |
Description of contents: |
This article provides a brief overview of the Property-Rights Theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and situates the theory in other literatures.
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