A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem

We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to the source. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Lorenzo, Leticia
Published in:	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. - Springer. - Vol. 59.2004, 3, p. 393-403
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Cost spanning tree problem \| Equilibria

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999601