A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs

This note reexamines the theory of optimal public enforcement when litigation costs are incurred if the defendant is prosecuted at trial, and when an out-of-court settlement is possible. Using a numerical example, it is shown that settlements and litigation costs can substantially alter the optimal system of public enforcement. It is also shown that failing to take these considerations into account can significantly lower the achievable level of social welfare

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Polinsky, Alan Mitchell ; Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Zivilprozess \| Civil litigation \| Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit \| Arbitration \| Gerichtliche Prozesskosten \| Litigation costs

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
Series:	NBER Working Paper ; No. w2114
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1986 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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