A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses

We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.

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Year of publication:	2006-07
Authors:	Weinschelbaum, Federico ; Arozamena, Leandro
Institutions:	Departamento de Economía, Universidad de San Andrés
Subject:	political economy \| structural reforms \| Argentina

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No. 24, pp. 1-5 Number 92
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008541365