A recursive core for partition function form games

We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Kóczy, László
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 63.2007, 1, p. 41-51
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	core \| externalities \| optimism \| partition function \| pessimism

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005068015