A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.

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Year of publication:	2009-08
Authors:	Steinbacher, Matej ; Steinbacher, Matjaz ; Steinbacher, Mitja

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Steinbacher, Matej and Steinbacher, Matjaz and Steinbacher, Mitja (2009): A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model.
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; C15 - Statistical Simulation Methods; Monte Carlo Methods
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217827