A simulation study of managerial compensation

A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help the incumbent firm fight off competition by promoting new exploration and risk-taking.(...)

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Sallans, Brian ; Pfister, Alexander ; Dorffner, Georg
Publisher:	Wirtschaftsuniversität <Wien>
Subject:	Vergütung \| payment \| Führungskraft \| Simulation \| simulation \| Risikoaversion \| Aktienoption

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	311296 bytes 23 p. application/pdf
Series:	Wirttschaftsuniversität Wien - Working Papers Working Papers SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science ; 2003, 101
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	Forecast, decision making ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844731