A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economics.

In allocation problems of perfectly divisible goods, we study the equity property of 'no-domination', according to which no agent can receive strictly more of all goods than any other agent. We prove that no-domination is incompatible with Pareto efficiency, as soon as preferences are allowed to be non-convex.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Maniquet, F.
Institutions:	University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Subject:	ALLOCATION \| EQUITY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	RCER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	9 pages
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808174