Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Staffiero, Gianandrea ; Exadaktylos, Filippos ; Espín, Antonio M.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 2, p. 236-238
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Ultimatum game \| Dictator game \| Altruism \| Selfishness \| Other-regarding preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C93 - Field Experiments ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041817