Adversarial scheduling analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion.

In (Istrate et al. SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms . In particular, our main result incorporates contagion into Peyton Young's model.

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Year of publication:	2008-04-09
Authors:	Istrate, Gabriel ; Marathe, Madhav V. ; Ravi, S.S.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	evolutionary games \| stochastic stability \| adversarial scheduling

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836243