Adverse selection and government intervention in life and health insurance markets
This thesis examines the workings of insurance markets. The first two papers examine the effect of government tax and regulatory policy in markets for supplementary health insurance. The third paper presents new evidence of the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets. The first paper examines the empirical consequences of imposing binding minimum standards on the market for private health insurance for the elderly in the United States. I find robust evidence of a substantial (40 percent) decline in insurance coverage associated with imposing these minimum standards. The standards are also associated with a reduction in coverage of non-mandated benefits among the insured. The minimum standards therefore, while requiring additional insurance coverage among the insured, were also associated with both extensive and intensive declines in insurance coverage. Considering all of these various changes, I estimate that the standards were, on net, welfare reducing. The second paper presents new evidence of the effect of the tax subsidy to employer-provided health insurance on coverage by such insurance.
|Year of publication:||
|Other Persons:||James M. Poterba and Jonathan Gruber. (contributor)|
|Institutions:||Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. (contributor)|
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|Type of publication:||Book / Working Paper|
|Type of publication (narrower categories):||Thesis|