Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets
This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry—and therefore, its negative consequences—decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993–2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Garven, James R ; Hilliard, James I ; Grace, Martin F |
Published in: |
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X. - Vol. 39.2014, 2, p. 222-253
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
Saved in:
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