Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories

Suppose an agency awards a fixed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical findings are related to awards data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Magee, Lonnie ; Veall, Michael R.
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Preisverleihung \| Sozialwissenschaft \| Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit \| Theorie \| Kanada \| scholarships \| fellowships \| applicant behavior \| selection committee behavior

More details

Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 617
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	846123096 [GVK] hdl:10419/21171 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262520