Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

We consider allocation problemswith indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods, that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Herrero, Carmen ; Martínez, Ricardo
Published in:	SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195. - Vol. 2.2011, 4, p. 453-467
Publisher:	Heidelberg : Springer
Subject:	Allokationseffizienz \| Präferenztheorie \| Unteilbarkeit \| allocation problem \| indivisibilities \| single-peaked preferences \| priority standard \| temporary satisfaction methods

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s13209-011-0046-7 [DOI] 688068383 [GVK] hdl:10419/77799 [Handle]
Classification:	D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317139