Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions

Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.

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Year of publication:	2007-08-09
Authors:	Gugl, Elisabeth
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Victoria
Subject:	Axiomatic bargaining \| resource monotonicity \| transferable utility \| risk aversion

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	ISSN 1914-2838 Number 0702 8 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D13 - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750323