An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games

An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, we give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.

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Year of publication:	1999-12-15
Authors:	Roubens, Marc ; Grabisch, Michel
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 28.1999, 4, p. 547-565
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Cooperative games \| interaction among players \| Shapley values \| Banzhaf values \| coalition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: October 1997/revised version: October 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598528