An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Fibich, Gadi ; Oren, Gal
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 122.2014, 2, p. 190-191
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Asymmetric auctions \| First-price auctions \| Maximal bid \| All-pay auctions

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010743703