An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts
This paper begins with a survey of the classical legal theory of torts. Then we motivate and describe the economic approach to accident law. We demonstrate that negligence rules under which one party bears the entire accident costs induce an efficient pattern of behavior in a setup with identical individuals. Finally, we show that liability rules which share damages are superior to negligence rules once we leave the identical individuals framework.
| Year of publication: |
1993
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Emons, Winand |
| Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 129.1993, IV, p. 625-642
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| Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
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