AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	TORSTENSSON, PÄR
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 11.2009, 01, p. 111-115
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Multilateral bargaining \| n-person bargaining \| subgame perfect equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964050