An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets.

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Year of publication:	1993
Authors:	Kim, Jae-Cheol ; Chang, Ki-Bok
Published in:	Journal of Regulatory Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 5.1993, 2, p. 183-97
Publisher:	Springer

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711200