Anreizsteuerung und Kollusionsgefahr

Based on the LEN-model KRAPP (1999, 2000) analyses for different constellations howcollusive behaviour of agents influences the principal’s welfare. We try to complement this analysisby considering additional scenarios. Furthermore, we take into account that the principal cannot ap-praise exactly whether agents collude or not. To simplify we assume in such situations that the princi-pal’s behaviour follows the Maximin-rule. Particularly, we deal with the problem under which circum-stances an incentive scheme based on cooperation is better than one which presumes competition be-tween the agents and therefore comes along with the danger of collusive arrangements. It turns out thatcollusive behaviour can be advantageous for the principal. This can still be valid if the principal as-sumes falsely that there is not a collusive cooperation between the agents.