Anreizwirkungen und Bewertung von Erfolgsbeteiligungen im Portefeuillemanagement

Performance fees for portfolio managers are designed to align the managers' goals withthose of the investors and to motivate managers to aquire "superior" information and tomake better investment decisions. A part of the literature analyzes performance fees on thebasis of market valuation. In this article it is shown that market valuation faces a dilemma:on the one hand, the conditions which allow for market valuation imply that the portfoliomanager perfectly hedges the performance fee. This in turn implies severe restrictions onthe incentive effects of the performance fee. In particular, the fee does not motivate themanager to use superior information for investment decisions concerning the managedportfolio. On the other hand, better incentives can only be generated under conditionswhich exclude market valuation. In this case, the analysis has to be based on expectedutility valuation.