ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM: PREFERENCE DIVERSITY IN A SINGLE-PROFILE WORLD

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-07
Authors:	Serrano, Roberto ; Feldman, Allan M.
Institutions:	Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
Subject:	Arrow's theorem \| single-profile \| preference diversity

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827088