Arrow's theorem for weak orders

We characterize binary decision rules which are independent and strongly paretian,or independent and almost strongly paretian when the individual preferences and the collective preference are weak orders.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel ; Moulen, Joël
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 29.2009, 3, p. 2038-2044
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Binary decision rule \| lexicographic dictatorship

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562901