Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

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Year of publication:	2002-11-01
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| asmmetric informatin \| Erwartungsbildung \| Experimentelle Spieltheorie \| Experimental Economics \| Auktionstheorie \| auction \| Rationalität \| rational behaviour

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Extent:	6 p. 131,09 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction Discussion Paper ; 0236 (2002) Economics Letters, 80 (2003), 195-199
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D44 - Auctions ; Consumer behaviour ; Study of commerce ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; Individual Articles ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

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