Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful

We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Schöb, Ronnie ; Thum, Marcel
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	minimum wages \| unemployment \| asymmetric information \| labour market regulation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2623
Classification:	H50 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies. General ; J20 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation. General ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000388