Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful

We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Schöb, Ronnie
Other Persons:	Thum, Marcel P. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Theorie \| Theory \| Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment \| Wirkungsanalyse \| Impact assessment

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (13 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 2623
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1392169 [DOI]
Classification:	J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies ; L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160522