Asymmetric parametric division rules

We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Stovall, John E.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 84.2014, C, p. 87-110
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Claims \| Bankruptcy \| Rationing \| Fair allocation \| Consistency \| Intrapersonal consistency

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753432