Attractive evolutionary equilibria

Berend Roorda; Reinoud Joosten

We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa. -- attractive evolutionary equilibria ; evolutionary dynamics ; evolutionary ; dynamic & structural stability

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Roorda, B. ; Joosten, Reinoud
Publisher:	Jena : Max-Planck-Inst. für Ökonomik
Subject:	Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 280,76 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Papers on economics and evolution. - Jena : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2195051-9. - Vol. 1117
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/57555 [Handle]
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409739