Auctioning off a favour: corruption and lobbying in a combo model

It is the prevailing approach in the public choice literature to model lobbying and corruption in the same manner. On the contrary, we attempt to capture both in the same framework (auction theory), but using different modelling approaches. We present a unified framework in which some interesting conclusions ensue, not the least the possibility of a benign view on corruption as in Besley (2006).

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Gerrits, Carsten ; Beckmann, Klaus
Publisher:	Frankfurt a. M. : Verein für Socialpolitik

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Series:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences ; E17-V2
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Conference Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	65515910X [GVK] hdl:10419/37517 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270146