Auctioning the Digital Dividend

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Cramton, Peter
Institutions:	University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
Subject:	Auctions \| spectrum auctions \| market design \| package auction \| clock auction \| combinatorial auction

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Papers of Peter Cramton.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Jan Kramer and Stefan Seifert (eds.), Communications Regulation in the Age of Digital Convergence: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Karlsruhe, Germany: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 32 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; L96 - Telecommunications
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997826